I have a great advantage over
people born and
educated
in America: I am neither. I have a privilege of discovering America at
an age when I can fully savor and appreciate the intellectual gifts of
the land, which the natives themselves, as well as younger newcomers,
either
take for granted or do not notice at all. Among them are a few
books,
long past their prime of fame, that can still stir up a storm in my
head.
The storm comes and goes, changing nothing in my life, but it leaves a
record, like memories of a stormy romance of younger years or like an
extraordinary
hurricane in the annals of meteorology.
Having
come in America in 1987, I missed a stimulating book published the same
year: Allan
Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education
has
Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students. 1987.
New York: Simon and Schuster. Occasionally I had seen
references
to it but I got hold of it no sooner than in 2001, while writing the
previous
Essay.
Only
by
the end of the book I realized that most of it was probably had come
from
the author's experience of 1969, when the faculty of the Cornell
University
was taken hostage (part in corpore, part in simile) by Black
student
extremists, who, by the way, did the same to the rest of Black
students.
It seems to be the case when liberal educators really got into a
traffic
accident of liberalism (see Essay
16. On Somebody Else ). They disputed, however, that the
accident
had happened at all, and as proof, changed the rules of the road post
factum.
I was surprised to learn
from the Web that the case had not been fully closed in over thirty
years.
A few links, presenting both sides, are given in the end NOTES.
The description
of the
events
in the book reaffirmed my conviction that the Soviet Communism was
simply
a configuration under a more general and universal pattern of enforcing
a code of behavior on a group of people under the threat of punishment.
Unlike a moderate fine for littering and speeding, hardly anybody
could afford to take the Soviet punishment, because it was to lose
everything
for life, and often the life itself.
As if not to leave any room for
doubt, Allan Bloom drew a parallel between the events at Cornell and
the
demoralization of German universities under the Nazis. And of course,
he
mentioned the oppressed Soviet humanities as well.
The pattern is so common through
lands and ages that I begin to believe that no idea is bad in itself,
only
the extent of violent power behind it.
The author's
remedy was
the
old Great Books: Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, philosophy in general,
and, even more generally, the traditional liberal education based on
values,
i.e., distinction between good and evil. From all my life experience I
conclude with certainty that natural sciences do not know this
distinction.
I think that this is the major cause of the rift between sciences and
humanities
formulated by C.P.Snow
(whom
Allan Bloom seemed to despise).
In Russia, I used
to
read
between the lines. In this way I learned from The Closing of the
American
Mind that, philosophy aside, sciences and humanities stood against
each other across a front line, competing for the place in the
curriculum,
honors, influence, and, I conjectured, money. They finally spoke the
same
Buckspeak languag after all.
This time,
however, I
wanted
to read across the lines.
Allan Bloom's
book
excited
me not because I agreed with him: I had strong doubts. Besides, except
for a few observations, I knew too little about American education. The
subject of reading, however, resonated in me very strongly. I never
lost
interest in education, my credo of which is simple: education gives the
map of knowledge, the rules of the road, and driving skills.
First of all, I had to
read
Bloom's
beloved Plato.
I read Plato before, but never
the entire Republic.
I have read it in the lively, witty translation by W.D.H. Rouse (not on
the Web) in which some Socrates' monologues sound with Shakespearean
colorful
intensity (the order of comparison, of course, should be reversed).
Republic came
as
a revelation. Unexpectedly, it brought me back to my childhood and
youth
and onward to my life long dream about of the bridge between sciences
and
humanities.
Concerning Plato, I made
two personal discoveries (they might have been already made by somebody
else).
I will start with the one
that would take less time to explain: the evolutionary origin of the
rift
between sciences and humanities.
Plato was the exact triple
point of divergence, right on the fork in the road, where sciences and
humanities did not yet differentiate.
Plato's unstable unity,
transcending into duality, resulted from his reasoning by analogies.
That
was quite natural since the formal
logic had not yet been created by Plato's disciple Aristotle. Analogy
is what can couple everything, but it is not an appropriate cement for
building science. The logic of Plato was bad, his syllogisms weak, and
Aristotle himself acknowledged that later. Plato's Socrates did his
tricks
without exact definitions, mixing the degrees of abstraction and using
the same word in a wide and narrow meaning in the same quasi-syllogism.
For example (Book
VI)
"Are they [those who define pleasure as good] not
equally
compelled
to admit that there are evil pleasures?"
"Undoubtedly.
"It follows that they admit the same things to be both good
and
evil; isn't that true?"
"Of course."
In my humble opinion, all
pleasures
are good as experienced sensations, but some are evil as deeds and by
their
consequences, so that there is no controversy. But Republic is
not
just a Hermaphrodite of science and humanities, it wears a few pieces
of
clothing from a theatrical wardrobe.
Reading Plato, I could
almost
feel Aristotle's hidden disgust when he was listening to Plato's poetic
images ascribed to Socrates. Aristotle by his nature, it seems to me,
was
more like a modern natural scientist, little concerned with politics,
poetry,
and events of the Cornell brand. Aristotle had created the apparatus
of
formal logic, which is still humming in our heads and computers without
a glitch, unless we lose guard, and that was an ax that hacked science
out of Plato. Aristotle's logic was for science like the rules of
antiseptics
for surgery.
The remaining half of Plato
was about values and the humanities grew from it.
Humanities are not about
Aristotelian logic and sciences are not about values. This is the
nature
of the rift. If there is anything capable to bridge it, it is still the
old Platonic analogy, abandoned today by all serious, reasonable,
positive,
and professionally successful people. A few still use it not so much
for
creating knowledge as for mapping it and flying instead of
crawling.
This returns me to my pet topic, my dada, and I'd better stop
here.
My second
discovery was
that
I was born and educated in the Platonic almost-Perfect State.
If Russia has any
reason
to demand compensation for Communism, it is from Greece. It was the
liberal
education based on Plato that infected both Marx and Lenin in their
youth.
But Plato infected, one way or another, all educated people in the
West,
until "Higher Education has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the
Souls
of Today's Students" in America.
In the Soviet
Union
where
I was born and grew up, Plato was followed up to the letter:
1. Literature was censored:
"Then first, as it seems, we must set up a
censorship
over
the fable-makers, and approve any good fable they make, and disapprove
the bad;..." (Book II)
2. An image of unity of leadership was maintained at the expense
of the truth:
"And he [young man] must never hear at all that
gods war
against
gods and plot and fight (for that is not true either), if our future
guardians
of the city are to believe it a very ugly thing to take offense among
themselves
easily." (Book II)
3. The God (Stalin) was installed and arts were instructed how to
properly portray Him:
"You agree, then," said I, "that this is the second
shape
[that
'God is simple and true in word and deed, and neither changes himself
nor
deceives others'] in which to tell stories and make poetry about gods;
that they are not wizards who change their forms, and they do not
mislead
us by falsehood in word or deed?" (Book II)
4. Unconditional and masochistic endurance among hardships was
taught—and
practiced—as a foremost value:
"But deeds of endurance against everything—when
such
things
are spoken or done by famous men, these they [young men] ought to see
and
to hear; for example:
Striking his breast he thus reproached
his
heart-
Endure, my heart! much worse you have endured!"
(Book III)
5. Writers were told what and how to write:
"They [poets and storytellers] declare that many
men are
happy
though unjust, and wretched although just; that injustice is
profitable,
if not found out, and justice good for others but plain loss for
oneself.
Such things we will forbid them to say, and command them to sing and to
fable the opposite, don't you agree with ?" (Book III)
NOTE that the Platonic idea of justice is
when
everybody
does his own business, not interfering with the work of others.
6. Foreign influence was warded off :
"Don't you think it an ugly thing and a great proof
of
bad
education to have to make use of justice imported from foreigners and
let
them be your masters and judges, for lack of the home-grown product?"
(Book
III)
7. Innovations in art was denounced as formalism:
"They [the overseers of the city] must guard it
[training
and
education] beyond everything and allow no innovation in gymnastic and
music
against the established order, but guard it with all possible care;..."
(Book IV)
8. Change of profession was made practically impossible:
"Well, we forbade the shoemaker to try to be a
farmer or
weaver
or builder; he was to make shoes, that the work of shoemaking might be
properly done for us. (Book II)
9. Composers and poets were punished for pessimism:
"However, we said we did not want dirges and
lamentations
also
among the words [i.e., song lyrics]."
"I don' know the scales," I said, "but leave the
particular
scale which
could suitably imitate the notes and tones of a brave man in warlike
action
and in all violent doings..." "And leave another for the works of peace
without violence..." (Book III)
NOTE: Dmitri
Shostakovich was criticized for formalism in the 40's. In
1954
he wrote quintessentially Platonic and bombastic "Festive
Overture,"
probably, inspired by Stalin's recent death. At an old age he
disposed
of any Platonism in his last symphonies and quartets. Anna
Akhmatova, a great poet who never was seduced by Platonism,
was
punished for her beautiful dirges and lamentations.
Those were
only a few superficial parallels; analysis of all links of the Soviet
system
to Plato would take a book. They are deeper that those to Orwell. Of
course,
there were plenty of differences.
I would mention four deepest Platonic roots of
Communism:
1. cult of order;
2. priority of the common purpose over an individual one;
3. cult of the truth, requiring, as any cult, an interpreter knowing
true from false;
4. belief (Lenin's favorite) that the "right" idea in human head
transforms
into
the "right" behavior.
The Soviet
Communists
were
moderate Platonists, however. They wiped out private property among the
masses (contrary to Plato, who suggested to take it from the leaders),
but they did not go as far as to make women and children a common
possession. The Soviet system was based as much on Machiavelli
as
on Plato. It gives me shudders to think about a Republic of orthodox
Platonists.
Paradoxically,
the
Communists,
typical idealists themselves, denounced Plato for philosophical
idealism
and barred him from the Communist Pantheon. Also, he was too
antidemocratic
for the Socialist Democracy.
The question is
why
history
has not (yet) confirmed Plato's prediction about degeneration of
democracy
into tyranny. Ironically, it was Karl Marx, on whose ideas the
Soviet
Platoland was founded, who once and forever prophetically put the
finger
on the true nature of Things: it is the unknown in times of Plato
production
of Things by Things (the Things were ignored not only but Plato but
also
by Aristotle who was much more interested in animals) that made
possible
a new structure of productive society and liberal democracy with it,
with
all its blessed vices, comfortable value-free culture, successful
narrow-minded
scientists, bright critics and dull apologists, hallowed tyranny of
money,
but no personal tyranny, where everybody is his or her own tyrant or
somebody
who dreams of being one.
Some other passages seem written today:
"Teacher
fears pupil in such state of things [democracy], and plays the toady;
pupils
despise their teachers and tutors, and in general, the young imitate
their
elders and stand up to them in word and deed. Old men give way to the
young;
they are all complaisance and wriggling, and behave like young men
themselves
so as not to be thought disagreeable or dictatorial." (Book VIII)
There is
an incomparable richness in Plato, both primeval and prophetic, and my
late anger is misaddressed. Republic is a unique and monumental
creation of human mind. It is crafted so artfully that it can easily be
disassembled into thousand building blocks. Some of them can be negated
and the entire pile can be reassembled into thousands of new
structures.
Plato is the Lego of philosophers. Generations of philosophers
personalized
the game and added a lot of new curious pieces to it, like ANGST
made in Germany and
NAUSEA
made in France. Finally, DECONSTRUCTION
, the term reeking of Lego, aimed at becoming the only apocalyptic game
in town.
What became clear
to me
after
reading Plato was how dangerous and tragic a quest for the truth could
be when books mate with life. The moral truth is what you believe
in, nothing more (a statement Allan Bloom vehemently opposed to). The
truth
of a philosopher-king, once implemented, can be as murderous as Mein
Kampf.
So much for
philosophy.
What
about reading?
I
remember
books since the age of four to five, when I could understand only the
pictures.
Books for me were part of
life, although I have since long differentiated between real life and
books.
Imaginary life is what remains if we subtract real life from the
entirety
of life.
By my limited observations,
humans and animals in the books did something they never did in
real
life, or did not do what they were supposed to do. People around me
would
never speak like authors or characters of the books. Many words were
indigenous
to the books only.
In my TV-free youth, books
were a separate world, maintaining twisted, like messed-up yarn,
relations
with reality. They offered an alternative non-Euclidean space
where
I could watch, travel, fly, teleport, build, destroy, and go back and
forth
between the two worlds. What united them was the atmosphere of
language.
It was the same air of the Russian language that mysteriously sustained
not only myself but all the book characters in the France, England, and
Germany of the translated into Russian books. They all, with all their
foreign names and habits, spoke Russian in the books. Today the Russian
people from the faraway past speak English in my memory.
With time I
discovered
that
the books I read became part of my code, as I would say today. My
behavior
was influenced by books, and no wonder it often either came in conflict
with life or was wasted because the rules of the books were not the
rules
of the life around.
The
influence of
books
was indirect and subtle. It did not provide me with any kind of
imperative.
It was the very stuff of thought, the ideas, concepts, notions, and
terms
that I could use as blocks for combining them into new configurations.
The word virtue, for example, was not used in everyday speech and if I
did not hear it on the radio or see in the books, I would never
discover
that such thing existed, the opposite of it was vice, and I would never
examine any fact in terms of virtue and vice (although I could reinvent
the distinction myself.).
The books
legitimized a
combination
of sounds or letters as carriers of meaning. As far as they occurred in
connection with other words, a web of meaningful words and statements
grew
in my mind.
I remember how my
father
took me to a flea market. It was right after the WW2 in a devastated by
the war and recent German occupation city. People would sell anything
for
bread. The junk was laid out right on the ground. It appeared as
yet another separate world, as rich as the books, and I got attracted
to
hardware for the rest of my life.
I saw a man fishing out
some small objects with a magnet suspended on a cord. The objects, less
than an inch long, looked like short pieces of tubes with wires
sticking
at both ends.
I asked my father what it
was. "Resistance," he said. It was beyond my understanding because the
word resistance meant a human attitude. It took several years before I
learned what resistance was from a course of physics and understood
that
the tubes were resistors . Some of them, made of ferromagnetic
wire,
stuck to the magnet and others, made of carbon, did not. To that
I have to add that both resistance and resistor are a single word in
Russian
(soprotivleniye), with the third meaning, like in English, of
underground
struggle against occupants.
Around 1948, the
Stalin's
Russia launched a campaign against "cosmopolitanism," i.e. foreign
influence.
It included the purge of words of foreign origin from the Russian
language
and claiming Russian historical priorities in science and technology,
starting
from the steam engine. The French bread was renamed "town bread."
Vienna rolls and Bologna sausage were also punished, together with
poets,
composers, and scientists branded as sycophants of the West. A nice
illustration
to Plato.
In the 70's, the
foreign
influence started creeping back, although the rolls and sausage still
were
part of "resistance" to the West. I saw, however, the English resistor
sneaking into Russian, and now it is the primary Russian translation of
the English word in an online
dictionary . Only in the 80's, however, when I discovered
uncensored
Judaism, it occurred to me that the core meaning of cosmopolitanism in
the newspeak of 1948-49 was "the Jews." More informed people got it
right
in an instant.
As an outstanding
Polish
writer
Stanislaw Jerzy Lec (1909-1962) said: "The window on the world can be
blocked
out by a newspaper." (see some other aphorisms
of Lec, of which my favorite is: I prefer the sign NO ENTRY to
the
one that says NO EXIT ; also).
By the same token, education can obscure the world view, and that was
apparently
another reason for Alan Bloom's anger.
I am
rambling
through
my childhood memories (something I do only once in a blue moon) in
order
to illustrate what books and education in general can do for a person.
It is the same as to supply a cobbler with leather and a carpenter with
wood. Books contain the very substance of intellect, the knowledge in
the
form of blocks (generators) and links (bond couples) between them.
Books
are assembled constructs of a Lego, but they can be disassembled and
rebuild
into new constructs. The properties of language make big jumps
possible,
like from electric resistance to underground resistance, and one can
fly
through the huge space of ideas and images, not just crawl.
I deny, however, that the
Book is a Holy Grail of truth, except for a believer.
The books can also supply
the cobbler with wood and the carpenter with leather, for which neither
one can have any use. (Reminder: I am a believer in useless things).
The manuals and textbooks
in science and technology provide positive, stable, and useful
knowledge.
The old Great Books provide a wonderful, mostly useless, junk to be
recycled,
rearranged, reassembled, and used for new devices like the old
resistors
fished out among the misery of the post-war city. I want to believe now
that somebody needed them to build a radio (all short wave radios had
been
confiscated in 1941, when the war started) and listen to the BBC in
Russian.
Under Plato's guidance, I can
design
pieces of Socratic dialogue:
"Are you saying, Thrasymachus, that the books are
always
useful?
Would that be of any use to supply a carpenter with leather?"
"Least of all."
"Then, if there is a book on making shoes, would it be of any use for
a carpenter?"
"Not at all."
Or:
"Are you saying, Thrasymachus, that
the
books
are of no use? Wouldn't that be useful to supply a carpenter with
wood?" etc.
Or:
"Are you saying, Glaucon, that the books on virtue
are of
no
use for either a carpenter or a cobbler? What if they had to defend
Athens
against the assault of barbarians?" etc.
Allan Bloom believed that
the neglect of classical liberal education was at the root of all
problems.
Education failed democracy. Why, then, the books and education of a
totalitarian
state supplied me with bricks to build my general liberal Western
mentality?
How could I acquire the modern democratic mentality in totalitarian
Russia?
Throughout my childhood
and youth, fiction, biographies, popular science, and adventures made
up
my reading list.
Books of independent authors
in social sciences and humanities in general were not available in
USSR.
An exception was made for pre-Marxist philosophy, but not for anybody
who
was criticized by Marx or Lenin as reactionary. I could not ask for the
Bible in the city library, but Hegel, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling were
available in old editions. Saint-Simon,
Thomas
More, Robert
Owen, Tommaso
Campanella, Charles
Fourier, and other utopians were all translated and nicely
published
as predecessors of Communism. It was the anti-utopias of Aldous
Huxley and George Orwell that were forbidden. Plato, denounced as
reactionary
idealist, was available in old editions and later even re-edited.
Without reading the Bible,
I knew all about the commandments and accepted them all but the first.
Moreover, the official Soviet ethics differed little from the ethics of
Plato. Freedom, pursuit of happiness, hard work, loyalty to the elected
government, the primate of common good were all both Soviet and
Platonic
values.
A Soviet
counterpart of
Allan
Bloom could have justly said that the Soviet education failed
totalitarianism.
But as democracy was strong enough in the USA with the failing liberal
education, totalitarianism was strong enough in Russia with the failing
totalitarian education.
As I have already
stated,
education for me is neither sciences, nor humanities, but a matter of
fact
map of knowledge. Thus, the student can be lost, but education cannot
fail,
nor can it serve. It is a part of initiation, an introduction into
life,
but not the life itself.
Books and life
are
different
things. If there is a discord between them, people look for a different
life or different books.
Democracy is not
a
choice,
it is a result. So was the totalitarian Republic in Russia. So was the
American Revolution. So will be any big social turn. It is presumed
that
democracy persists because people vote for democracy, but people do it
for their own reasons, and the reasons may change, as it happened in
Germany,
the land of philosophers, in 1933. Student extremists in America may
have
their reasons, liberal students in China may have theirs. If such
brilliant
people as Plato, Nietzsche, Allan Bloom, and Francis
Fukuyama had some reservations about democracy, an average
voter
can have them, too, if the weather changes. The Lego pieces marked Autocracy,
Aristocracy, Dictatorship, Oligarchy, and even Anarchy
and Communism are all in the game,
but,
unlike in the times of Plato, discourse is not a pastime of friends but
a competition. The truths compete in the marketplace of ideas, with
attached
price tags.
On the map of
knowledge,
analogies are highways to understanding, the fastest routes from point
to point. Analogy does not prove anything, but the analogy between all
complex competitive systems points to a possible direction for the
search
for answers. Like Plato's logically weak dialectics, it stimulates
imagination
and generates hypotheses.
The
following
passage
in Allan Bloom's dialectics stimulated my imagination:
I suspect that if we were to make a law forbidding
the
use
of any of the words on the imposing list in this section, a large part
of the population would be silenced. Technical discourse would
continue;
but all that concerns right and wrong, happiness, the way we ought to
live,
would become quite difficult to express. These words are there where
thoughts
should be, and their disappearance would reveal the void. The exercise
would be an excellent one, for it might start people thinking about
what
they really believe, about what lies behind the formulas ( page
238).
Having
no company, I asked myself a Socratic, and therefore potentially
offensive,
question:
"What if the old Great Books, including Plato, suddenly
disappeared,
together with all the references to it? Would we lose anything? notice
their absence? find ourselves in moral darkness? would productivity
drop?
real estate go up? would we kill the neighbor?"
This is a question that
can be asked about any great book, including the Bible. The Christians
would not necessarily be all converted into Islam or Buddhism as the
largest
alternatives to Christianity. Neither they would all become pagans or
atheists.
I believe that the Christian ideas could be largely reconstructed from
the remaining literature, history, artifacts, and even reinvented by
mutation
of existing religions, although not in exactly the same form.
This is pure fantasy, a
thought experiment, and it is what I like most about books. The
function
of the old and new Great Books is to heat up the mind, melt it, and not
to cast it into a standard mold. The educator cannot be responsible for
the bizarre shapes the liquid takes when it cools down, especially, if
there is no mold at all.
The above
experiment
was
in fact conducted in the Soviet Union where the Bible could not be
obtained
even in a large library without a special permission given only to
Marxist
scientists, and local libraries did not have it at all.
I first held the entire
Bible in my hands only at the age of forty. It was never to be found
without
a hard effort. The Bible had disappeared from the Soviet life, but its
genes were alive in the classical Russian literature. The Soviet book
editors
usually supplied books, especially, older or translated, with extensive
notes and commentaries. Uncommon names and words were also often
explained
in footnotes, so that I could learn something about Judaism even
without
the Torah.
My
hypothesis
is that the ideas of the extinct Plato would regenerate in some
primitive
forms and then reassemble themselves, like the androids of sci-fi
movies
that can melt into a mercury-like liquid and then grow from it back to
shape.
The
language
is the mercurial liquid. It contains most words used by Plato, except
maybe
proper names. But to bring the shapeless mercury into a shape we would
need a source of order.
My other
hypothesis is
that
metaphor and analogy could be such a source of order. Like scientific
terminology,
which now surpasses common language in volume, was created mostly from
the words of common language, live or dead, by analogy or
metaphor,
the reverse process, in the absence of humanities, could create
something
comparable to Plato's Dialogues by analogy or metaphor
referring
to scientific terminology.
Plato reminds me
of
stem
cells, the buzz of the day. Plato split in two when sciences and
humanities
grew from his method in Dialogues as two different tissues. A
second
division, in a different plane, happened with his political ideas.
Communism
and Socialism (they split afterwards) formed a tissue from his
idea
of common good, while the ultimate individualism of American society
can
be traced to his idea of justice as non-interference in each other's
business.
Starting with Plato, I had
to move to Aristotle. His Nichomachean
Ethics is already a different world, stern and cool, but
beautifully
rational after beautifully contradictory and controversial Plato. I was
not able to find any inconsistency in Aristotle. His Organon,
familiar
to me since high school, shines with white enamel, chrome and nickel of
a modern laboratory where thoughts of all breeds are kept in cages by
hundreds
and dissected like rats.
What I found in Nichomachean
Ethics was my favorite idea of the split between life and books.
Aristotle
recurs to it throughout the entire book. Life is life and books are
books,
and they complement each other. In the end, he notes:
"Even medical men
do
not
seem to be made by a study of textbooks."
Reading Aristotle I
felt
myself
not a skeptical, suspicious, tired, absentminded, and disillusioned old
man but a shy overweight teenager listening in awe to Simon Wool
(Semyon
Moiseyevich Vul, as his Russian-Jewish name was), an eccentric teacher
of logic in Stalinist Russia of 1952, swarthy, with dark piercing eyes,
high brow, receding unkempt hair, in white canvas suit, who was telling
us, thirty boys of the ninth grade, about Aristotle, chanting "Barbara,
Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris ..., " the Medieval compendium of
correct syllogisms.
Well over the
hill of
my
life, I hear Aristotle giving me in the quick raspy voice of Simon Wool
the last vindication: the contemplative life is the happiest.
I found a
contradiction
even
in Aristotle, didn't I?
Life
is life and books are books, and never the twain shall meet ...
except in poetry, from which I paraphrased a line :
Having
survived
the Platonic Cave, I am still not disappointed, to my own surprise, on
a bad day, in the liberal democracy, with all my ANGST and all my
NAUSEA,
and even witnessing its turn to the next stage: