Yuri Tarnopolsky
ESSAYS
27.
The Existential Sisyphus Use Firefox browser or see essays-complete.pdf |
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Essay 27. The
Existential Sisyphus
The
image of Sisyphus has captured my imagination
since my early school years. In
Russia, the history of Ancient World was taught in
the fifth grade and mythology was part of
it. Besides, "Sisyphus' labor" was a
common expression in the Russian language and
throughout my life I was periodically sentenced to
what it meant. It was not as much futility as
compulsion that depressed me in such work. My very
first month of college experience was Sisyphus'
labor in the corn fields of Ukraine, to which all
the freshmen were condemned for the lack of hands
on the collective farms. We were simply loaded
into freight trains and open cargo trucks and
unloaded in the midst of the steppe. Sisyphus
has to spend energy to accomplish his chore.
Energy is a fundamental concept of Everything and
not just physics. There is no definition of energy
in some more primary terms. Energy in human life
is what our brain and muscles have to spend in
order to either accomplish something or to fail.
They can spend it only if they first consume it. The
distinction between success and failure is alien
to physics. Instead, physics offers a key
distinction between two kinds of energy: creative
work and destructive heat. More important,
it describes the ways to convert the latter into
the former, which has been the true essence of the
Industrial Revolution, our current civilization,
and some of the current global conflicts. Through
the narrow isthmus of information theory, physical
ideas penetrate the continent of humanities and
spread north to south like the ancient Asian
wanderers through the American continent. Hundreds
of millions of people on earth are still living
off sheer muscle power. A few lucky nations live
off the sale of energy taken from beneath the
surface of the earth. Other nations keep
themselves happy by converting the mineral energy
and matter into countless Things and moving
around. The Things in the form of weapons invade
the jungles and deserts and disrupt the
pre-industrial way of life without offering
anything else. The
image of Sisyphus connects the physical and human
aspects of energy. It links physics to ethics.
This is a long shot: a Seattle to Miami highway on
the map of Everything. I am coming back to
it again, hopefully, for the last time. Transition
state applies to a system in process of transition
from one relatively stable state to another stable
state.
Of
course, no final state can be literally final.
"Final" is a metaphor. Transition
states can be subdivided into shorter intermediate
periods of lower and higher instability. On
September 11, 2001, America entered a historical
transition state. There was an approximately two
week long period of high agitation and some
confusion, which ended in an intermediate quieter
state of awareness and preparedness. The
next transition state was expected to be a
military campaign and it started on October 7. The
ideal final state would be the world with very low
probability of large scale terrorism over
state borders. The
true transition state, by definition, cannot last
long. It has to undergo relaxation somehow and
decrease its energy. In social systems, transition
state consumes so much energy that human nature,
social structure, and productive forces simply
cannot sustain this way of life. All wars end with
victory, defeat, or peace treaty and all
revolutions end up in some kind of order,
even if pregnant with another crisis. The
energy that is released in a burning piece of
paper is a subject of physics. The
somewhat mysterious human energy that is released
or transformed in acts of creation, destruction,
and reform, is ultimately a form of the same
universal energy because it all comes from food,
but this does not tell us how to measure the
spiritual energy of humans like we measure the
electricity and gas consumption by corresponding
meters. I have
no ready research on the subject of creative human
energy, but some crude ways to measure it have
been since long universally accepted . Thus, the
number of scientific publications and the number
of references to them in other publications are
components of a measure of width and depth of
scientific productivity. The number of
publications alone does not characterize
creativity. Randall
Collins, in his already mentioned (in Essay
24, On Myself ,) outstanding book The
Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of
Intellectual Change (Cambridge,
Massachusetts,
and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University, 1998), measures
the eminence of a philosopher by the number of
references to him in books on history of
philosophy. He also introduces the emotional
energy as one of the two major properties of a
philosopher in competition with other
philosophers for "attention space." The
other property is cultural capital that can be,
probably, metaphorized as matter. This
kind of quantitative method (somebody called it
"an orgy of tabulation") in sociology can be
traced back to Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968), the
American sociologist of Russian descent who in his
multivolume Social and Cultural Dynamics
(1937-1941) measured the intensity of historical
process—its energy, as I would say—by the mere
number of acts of revolt, turmoil, and
revolution. Sorokin's outstanding idea was to give
a certain weight factor to the amplitude of the
turmoil, so that a lot of small events would weigh
as much as a few big ones. In
textbooks of sociology I found notes of surprise
(for example, in George Ritzer, Sociological
Theory, NY: A.Knopf, 1983) that Sorokin had
been ignored by contemporary sociologists. Now it
looks natural in the light of the competition for
attention space and span. While natural sciences
are collective enterprises where theoretical
conflict is short-living and can be resolved by
experiment and observation, social sciences are
still in the transition to a collective and
cooperative mode of operation by methodological
consensus. Even
with such a hyper-ego-charged field as philosophy,
where a newcomer first shatters all the existing
temples and then proceeds to build his own edifice
from the repainted bricks, the prospect of a
unified approach seems more than fantasy. Randall
Collins believes that a kind of meta-mathematics
can be its ultimate distant shape. Now,
back to Sisyphus from whom a chain of links leads
to philosophy and existentialism in particular. Albert
Camus' essay on Sisyphus, poetically vague, full
of paradoxes, and with ample space for multiple
interpretations, is considered an existentialist
text. It is about suffering, time, and triumph. Existentialist
philosophy is a diverse and incongruent
international collection of works themselves
swathed into thick layers of interpretation. Any
philosophy (and usually a piece of scientific
work) starts with declaring a problem.
Existentialism does so by rejecting the ancient
idea, first introduced by Aristotle, that all
humans are essentially equal. It discriminates
between common man and an intellectual. The
problem is the inherent, not just transient,
anxiety, discomfort, anguish, and suffering of
modern intellectual. The anguish, like modern
laxative, comes in several flavors. I
would refer for existentialism itself to a web site (there are
many others) and to a small and old book that
states some existentialist tenets with
incomparable clarity hardly found in the primary
sources themselves: Robert G.
Olson, An Introduction to Existentialism, New York: Dover
Publications, 1962. This book does something the
sources do not: it places existentialism as a
configuration in the history of philosophy and shows
what bricks of the wrecked old temples were used as
they were, and which were repainted white to black,
or, following Randall Collins' idea, taken with the
minus sign, i.e., as negation. I do
not feel any affinity to existentialism and I am
not much familiar with the original works, except
Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky. I have only a
superficial, mostly from anthologies, knowledge of
Kierkegaard and Sartre. All four possessed an
intense imagination, creating a stream of
metaphors and brilliant fragments. They all,
especially, Kierkegaard, are illustrations of what
temperature of a mental process is. Sometimes,
there is such a tumult in my head that it feels as
though the roof had been lifted off my cranium,
and then it seems as though the hobgoblins had
lifted up a mountain and were holding a ball and
festivities there—God preserve me!
Prone,
outstretched,
trembling, Like him, half dead and cold, whose
feet one warm'th-- And shaken, ah! by unfamiliar
fevers, Shivering with sharpened, icy-cold
frost-arrows, By thee pursued, my fancy!
Ineffable! Recondite!
Sore-frightening! Thou huntsman 'hind the
cloud-banks! Now lightning-struck by thee, Thou
mocking eye that me in darkness watcheth: —Thus do I lie, Bend myself, twist myself,
convulsed With all eternal torture, And smitten By
thee, cruellest huntsman, Thou unfamiliar—GOD...
(Friedrich
Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, LXV). Sartre seems to me more
calculating. Eloquent in polemics, he pattered on
substance in his hyphenated, in the manner of German
philosophy, jargon. Love
is a fundamental relation of the for-itself to the
world and to itself (selfness) through a
particular woman; the woman represents only a
conducting body which is placed in the circuit.
(Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness).
My
private view is that Soren Kierkegaard
(1813-1855), who is regarded the unsuspecting
founder of the movement, was part of the general
movement of European psyche from the comfort of
belonging to a privileged group such as social
class (with ample leisure time) , position
(teaching), education (university) , and creed
(mainstream Christianity), in other words, from
stable-state group mentality, toward
individualism, in which Renaissance and Montaigne
in particular were true starters. His inflamed
imagination was jumping over the landscape of
individualism in all directions back and forth,
never staying in a valley of a system, and it was
the landscape itself that he left to be
rediscovered later. Like Nietzsche and
Dostoyevsky, he was a walking transition state,
but unlike them, his transition was reversible:
all valleys were equally green. What Sartre
did was an attempt to create a system. If the
truth is subjective, no system is possible. With
perfect logic, postmodernism swept away the very
idea of truth. When
the society loses the rigid hierarchy and group
structure that used to stretch the safety net
under the upper windows and balconies, the
intellectual suddenly feels naked, vulnerable, and
burning in the hell of competition. No collective
idea can offer comfort. A profitable sale can. Dostoyevsky
(1821-1881) and Nietzsche (1844-1900), two most
intense, obsessed with religion, and psychotic
writers of the well-mannered nineteenth century
were in the vanguard of the next wave,
unknowingly. No translation can render the
pathology of Dostoyevsky in original, and
Nietzsche in Zarathustra speaks for
himself. Both were mentally unwell, diabolically
creative, and feverishly intense. Both
posthumously attracted scores of worshippers. Preoccupied
with the transient and problematic individual
life, they came to opposite conclusions: Nietzsche
appealed to the superman in man, while
Dostoyevsky's ideals were selfless love, humility,
self-restriction, and compassion. With hindsight,
we can consider them prophets of the nightmares of
next century. A lover, family man, and
intellectual is given a gun and sent to kill and
be killed. Fascism
appropriated Nietzsche, but very few can see that
the Dostoyevsky's ideal of humility and
self-sacrifice was partly incorporated into
Stalinism and subsequent Communist ethics. As it
was typical for that period, access to his books
under Stalin was restricted, he was declared
reactionary, and was not studied at school. Both
writers were posthumously recruited into the
existentialist camp together with Kierkegaard who
published his books at his own expense, mostly,
under pseudonyms and was translated from Danish
only in 1941. NOTE : Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) connected the
names of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and used
the term "existential philosophy." Martin
Heidegger (1889-1976), not a writer but a pure and
complex philosopher, denied his link to the
movement, but was hooked up anyway. I have
an impression that philosophy of the twentieth
century was in the same relation to their
predecessors as abstract art to classical one.
I believe that existentialism, as
we know it, was single-handedly created and promoted
by Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Philosophy went on
sale.
NOTE:
Randall Collins' The Sociology of Philosophies
is full of sparkling and irreverent observations
and outbursts. Existentialism takes slapping on
both cheeks from him . He brands existentialism
as “...the highbrow end of the writer’s
market.” “literary-academic hybrid” (p.764-756).
He notes that "Sartre was the first
philosopher in history to be heavily publicized by
popular mass-media." To analyze
postmodernism for him was beyond dignity. Still,
the knot of controversies in Sartre is intriguing.
Sartre
and his generation lived under the shadows
of Marx, Hitler and Stalin. The third wave, and,
especially, Sartre, was driven by the humiliating
personal experience of the world wars, as well as
by infatuation and subsequent disappointment in
Marxism. Personal lives of practically all
existentialist writers were deeply troubled for
different reasons and they had a brush with one
historical rhinoceros or another. What
they all discovered, I believe, was a deep
inequality of people before the fate, otherwise
called God. The fate was unjust. The fate was deaf
to all religious and philosophical principles,
intelligence, sophistication, education, and
self-perception of the victim. The fate spat on
Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. The fate was lawless.
Atheistic
existentialism created a new faith centered around
individual who was lost among other countless
individuals. The existential creed was neither
monotheism nor polytheism. It was multitheism or
autotheism: each individual was his own god, with
all due reverence to God, and had to make his own
fate—something known since long, natural, and
subject of pride in America. A God's blessing was
simply a start whistle for the fight.
Paradoxically, the suffering individual had to
listen... not to himself, as the logic would
require, but to Sartre and Co. who incredibly
complexified simple dilemmas of everyday life and
repackaged the old and simple personal philosophy
of the common man. Why
then was Sartre so involved with Marxism? I
believe that the political doctrine offered to
individualists a new group platform with the
promise: the happy ones, the bourgeois, will be
punished. This is how Marxism recruited
intelligentsia in Russia and abroad. Kierkegaard
sounds like Marx when he lashes out at happy
bourgeois: Morality
is to them the highest, far more important than
intelligence; but they have never felt enthusiasm
for greatness, for talent even though in its
abnormal form. Their ethics are a short summary of
police ordinances; for them the most important
thing is to be a useful member of the state, and
to air their opinions in the club of an evening;
they have never felt homethickness for
something unknown and faraway, nor the depth
which consists in being nothing at all...(Soren
Kierkegaard, The Journals, July 14,
1837) It (capitalism)
has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of
religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm,
of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of
egotistic calculation
Somebody who cannot be happy,
cannot stand the sight of happiness around. A
cynical believer in simple reason, I see a straight
line between the terrible poverty in which Marx and
his family lived in London and his idea of
expropriating the bourgeoisie ("In one word, you
reproach us with intending to do away with your
property. Precisely so; that is just what we
intend." Manifesto, Part 2). So
much for existentialism. I am ashamed of my own
cynicism. As Tanweer
Akram noted,
existentialism was confusing but intoxicating. Regardless the answers, the
questions existentialism raised were legitimate. It
was about the detailed philosophical mechanism of
human life, not about grand abstractions. To my own surprise, I found some
parallels between existentialism and the concept of
transition state. My
link to Albert Camus' Sisyphus is the
metaphor of a hill, energy, and work. Camus was
interested in the moment when Sisyphus was
descending the hill, for a short while free of his
burden. In the natural, not mythical, transition
process, it is the least interesting part because
it is spontaneous and does not require effort. It
is like the behavior of the basketball when
it has already gone through the hoop: it
does not matter. The
existential view of life is a chain of decisions
that man has to make. The doomed Sisyphus of the
myth cannot make any decision: all decisions have
been made for him. Whatever he thinks and feels
does not matter: the ball has gone through the
hoop. Camus' essay is a piece of art that has as
much to do with life as Picasso's nudes with his
models. And
yet there is a deep truth in the existentialist
metaphor: choice as transition from deterministic
being to unpredictable and pregnant with
novelty becoming. The
question is how the future is made. Can we
influence it? Should we just rely on God in heaven
or God of Spinoza under our feet? How should we
accept suffering? How can we avoid it? Those
are some of the questions philosophy tried to
answer by searching with the mental flashlight
over immutable and internal ideas, God, spirit,
laws of nature, and even the transient and
fleeting surface of things. Unlike
philosophy, physics has a limited yet universal
vocabulary of thermodynamics for the entire
diversity of the world. For physics, life
and society are open systems far from equilibrium.
It is the relation between consumption and
dissipation of energy (production of order)
that characterizes their dynamics. If in
my metaphorical illustrations I use energy instead
of production of order, it is with the sole
purpose of simplifying of the picture. The
accurate, although not complete, physical picture
can be found in popular form in the numerous books
by Ilya Prigogine, a Nobel Laureate in
physics whose autobiography
clearly shows him as a Renaissance man deeply
immersed in arts and humanities. The
title of one of his books, From Being to
Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical
Sciences, ( San
Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co.,1980), restates
the central problem of existentialist philosophy,
although he, as far as I know, did not join any
philosophical ranks. He wrote in an
interview : I
have attempted to build a physics that
incorporates time at the elementary level. In
other words, I want to give a new formulation to
the idea of laws of nature: Rather than
speaking about these laws as deterministic, I want
to express them in a way that involves both
probability and "irreversibility" - chance and
time. The same cause does not always yield the
same effect, either on the macro or on the
elementary level. On a
different occasion (1983) : The
new description of time puts in a new perspective
the question of the ethical value of science. This
question could have no meaning in a world viewed
as an automaton. It acquires a meaning in a vision
in which time is a construction in which we all
participate. These two quotations, plucked from the Web, in no way can substitute for Prigogine's popular books, as none of my Essays can substitute for printed sources, but they give a taste of both the author's ambition and his existentialist stimulus. Prigogine was interested in the major problems posed by modern philosophy: being and becoming, equilibrium and irreversibility, novelty and boredom, choice and chance—the landscape mapped by Sartre along the travel journals of Kierkegaard. My personal vision of existence of
complex systems comes from Ilya Prigogine and
Ulf Grenander. I apply it equally to an individual
and society. Both can be torn apart, fell in love,
swing between sadism (of nationalism) and masochism
(of multiculturalism), suffer defeat and
intoxication of victory, build, destroy, trade,
waste, reform, grow, fell ill, and die. I have to repeat once again two illustrations from my previous essays. In the mythical
Underworld, the doomed Sisyphus has no choice. He
cannot change his future. His circular present
consists of repeating the same cycle of rolling
the rock uphill and following it down. This picture
symbolizes for me the deterministic world where
the future is entirely predictable and the laws
of Nature are known. Contrary to Camus, he
is the common man, a robot. He gets up every
morning to do his quote and goes to bed with his
stone as the pillow.
In the
real world, humans and nations have hope,
aspiration, and their own design of the future. An
optimistic Sisyphus of the upper world imagines
his future as a green valley on the other side of
the hill. He spends energy to overcome the
obstacle of gravity and reaches the top. He has a
good chance to run after the stone toward the
cheerful trees where he can finally rest. As the
physical vision of the world tells us, the factor
of probability interferes with human will at this
point. There is only a chance, with probability
from 0 to 1, but usually much less extreme, that
the stone will tumble down the other side. This is
what happens in the inanimate nature. My last long picture shows the
Sisyphus of the simplified existential vision of
life.
The existential Sisyphus has his vision of the
other side which can be quite unrealistic, as I
tried to show with the color of the trees. Sisyphus
is a realist and he knows that there is a largely
unknown landscape behind the hill but he believes
that he will be able to repeat his deed, if not at
the first attempt, and reach the next valley. New
vistas will open ahead, and the same general
scenario will be repeated, but not in detail, and
these are the limits of human power over the future.
Nobody knows which hill will be last. The novelty is
the reward for the toil. Contrary to Einstein, God
casts dice. The
picture can be interpreted, trans-metaphorized,
for example, as the personal philosophy of Don
Juan, for whom a woman is just a short stay in a
valley and the meaning of life is in the very
process of climbing the hill and the novelty of
the new vistas. For Don Juan, however, all the
distant hills are green and there is no gray color
in the palette of the fate. The
picture equally applies to the philosophy of
writer, politician, and scientist, with different
kinds of accomplishment (not excluding that of Don
Juan). The movie Quills, however
disgusting, carries the idea perfectly. I see
no borderline, however, between an intellectual
and a common man. Paraphrasing Ernest Hemingway,
the intellectual is a common man who does not know
that he is common. I see no reason to abolish the
old idea of Aristotle and castigate the common
man, as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche (and Francis
Fukuyama after him) did. The difference is simply
in the abilities, imagination, goals, and the
roughness of the terrain. The difference is in
detail. The intellectual is as much a sublimation
of the common man as compulsive travel is
sublimation of watching the TV travel channel. Two
things lacked from the initial general picture
of Prigogine's universe, and I believe he
completed it in his latest books. First,
it is the phenomenon of competition. Crowds of
people are rolling their stones up the same hill
and they help or hinder each other. Besides,
the valley can house only a limited number of
inhabitants, so that the landscape is in a
continuous flux, as if it were made of soft
rubber. The
idea of competition comes from Darwin. It was
elegantly translated into a physical form by Manfred
Eigen , a Nobel
Laureate (1967) in Chemistry, and, not
accidentally, a musician. It became one of
cornerstones of the modern science
of complexity, the
major problem with which is that it is has become
very complex. NOTE:
The complexity of the science of complexity can
both add to and subtract from the status of
science of complexity as mathematoid philosophy of
the future, for which science of complexity has no
claims. It is a developing and exciting area of
mathematics inseparable from computing. Social
competition, in the form it takes in democracy,
did not always exist. Even a superficial look
at history shows that the precarious
competitive landscape is a relatively new
phenomenon. In authoritarian societies the
absolute majority of people knew their place. I
mean here not the competition between a handful of
kings or their vassals, but the competition
of a large, actually, indefinite numbers of
participants, so that I do not dispute Collins'
vision (see his "law of small numbers"). Second,
it is the concrete difference between people,
landscapes, their stones, and their visions of
the valley.
This—structural—type of vision is completely
absent from physics and even from the science of
complexity. It is common for chemistry, biology,
anthropology, and history. It is also common for
everyday life where we never encounter a man or a
woman but only somebody with a face, name, gender,
voice, and smile, or at least a social security
number. The
task of developing the general principles of a
theory of differences between individual objects
was accomplished by Ulf Grenander in Pattern
Theory. Other much less general and,
apparently, independent undertakings in the same
key belong to Christopher Alexander (Essay 23)
and Randall Collins, not to mention the entire
science of chemistry. The key word here is
pattern. Since
I am interested here only in a map of knowledge
and not in the knowledge itself, I have to stop
here, on the threshold of an immense, exciting,
and frustrating area where I was wandering
for twenty years as tourist without map. Existentialism did not develop
any consistent and non-trivial ethics. Reading
Olson, and, especially, Collins, I asked
myself: what is my personal philosophy? Here is a
draft.
If only I could follow my own philosophy... But then I would be a robot. 1. Quotation
from an Interview with New
Perspectives Quarterly (Spring, 1992). NPQ: You don't see a
danger in the utopian perspective? Much of
modernism was spent forging one utopia or
another, which led more often than not to some
fairly horrific consequences. PRIGOGINE: I am more afraid of a
lack of utopias. I am afraid of the drying out of
incentive. For example, if you think about
politics for a moment, life becomes very
uninteresting if incentives for conduct are
limited strictly to economic exchanges. However,
when we bring in the idea of nature, and
visions of the natural world we would like to
live in, or the idea of other civilizations,
and the relationships we would like to have
with them, "politics" takes on a whole new
meaning.
3.
Randall
Collins occupies my mind even more than
Sisyphus. I simply must give a sample of
his style, which is also an example of physical
vision of elite humanitarian world: Visualize a small number of
particles—three to six—moving through a tunnel of
time; each draws energy from its past momentum,
renewed and accelerated by repulsion from the
other particles. This tunnel is the attention
space of the intellectual world; indeed the tunnel
is created by the movement of the particles and
the tensions that connect them. The tunnel’s walls
are not fixed; it extends forward in time only so
long as the negative interplay of the particles
keeps up a sufficient level of energy. As
arguments intensify, the tunnel becomes brighter,
more luminous in social space; and as positions
rigidify, going their own way without reference to
one another, the attention space fades. Surrounding the tunnel are the
ordinary concerns of the lay society. Persons on
the outside notice the intellectual tunnel only as
much as the glow of its debates makes it visible
from a distance. Intellectual stratification is
represented by distance from the core of the
tunnel. The walls of the tunnel are no more than a
moving glow generated from within. The
trajectories of the particles and the borders
between light and shadow are seen most sharply at
the center, by viewers situated on the main energy
lines. The farther one is from the central zone,
the harder it is to see where the walls are, this
membrane of relevance for the controversialists
inside it. In the half-light of semi-focused
regions, it is easy to mistake residues of old
arguments for the central issues that will
generate the forward thrust of the attention
space. Provincials, latecomers, and autodidacts
flail in the wake of past disputes but do not
catch up with the bright center of energy. (Pages 791-792).
4. While existentialism considered
individual life as object, any thermodynamical
approach could be applied only to large ensembles,
such as society. Something like
thermodynamics of small systems (in the sense of Essay
24), as far as I know, is a wasteland.
Nevertheless, pattern theory and social psychology
suggest that this could be possible by using
probability as measure of energy and energy as
measure of probability, correspondingly. |
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